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rights protected by the Constitution.”7 Public Citizen, the liberal 
litigation group founded by Ralph Nader, argues that “rights 
protected by the Constitution were intended for natural people.”8 
Free Speech for People, one of the groups most influential in the 
anti-personhood movement, is pushing a “People’s Rights 
Amendment” (the “PRA”) declaring that “the rights protected 
by this Constitution” are “the rights of natural persons.”9 Under 
the PRA, “corporate entities” would be “subject to regulations as 
the people . . . deem reasonable.” Corporations, that is, would not 
be able to claim any constitutional right.10 A version of the PRA 
was sponsored in the last Congress by Senator Jon Tester of 
Montana and Congressman Jim McGovern of Massachusetts. It 
would declare that “the rights protected by this Constitution” are 
“the rights of natural persons.” By their count, sixteen states and 
nearly 600 localities have endorsed some kind of anti-personhood 
amendment.11 Moreover, the movement against corporate 
personhood has benefitted from the intellectual heft offered by a 
number of prominent legal scholars, including several speaking at 
the conference that engendered this series of essays.12 In a 
 
 7. COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/issues/money-in-politics/index
.jsp?page=2 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). The Reich video is at https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=eg3-yrZnxe0 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
 8. A Constitutional Amendment to Keep Corporate Money Out of Elections: 
Corporations Are Not People, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/documents/DIFP-
Corporations-are-Not-People-Citizens-United-Fact-Sheet.pdf  (last visited March 28, 
2015). 
 9.  The People’s Rights Amendment, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, http://www.
freespeechforpeople.org/node/527 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). The text of the proposed 
amendment is as follows: 
Section 1. We the people who ordain and establish this Constitution intend the 
rights protected by this Constitution to be the rights of natural persons. 
Section 2. People, person, or persons as used in this Constitution does not include 
corporations, limited liability companies or other corporate entities established 
by the laws of any state, the United States, or any foreign state, and such 
corporate entities are subject to such regulations as the people, through their 
elected state and federal representatives, deem reasonable and are otherwise 
consistent with the powers of Congress and the States under this Constitution. 
Section 3. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit the people’s rights 
of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free exercise of religion, and such 
other rights of the people, which rights are inalienable. 
 10.  More precisely, any claim of constitutional right by a corporation, would receive 
rational basis review, the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Williamson v Lee 
Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (“The law need not be in every respect logically 
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for 
correction, and that it might be thought that he particular legislative measure was a rational 
way to correct it.”). 
 11. Elections Show Americans Ready to Amend the Constitution (Press Release), 
MOVE TO AMEND  (Nov. 5, 2014), available at https://movetoamend.org/press-release/
election-shows-americans-ready-amend-constitution. 
 12. Legal Advisory Committee, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, http://freespeechfor
people.org/node/597 (last visited May 1, 2015). 
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moment when the progressive left seems listless, this movement 
has genuine energy. 
This essay is a critique of this attack on corporate 
personhood. I will explain that the corporate separateness—
corporate “personhood”—is an important legal principle as a 
matter of corporate law. What’s more, as a matter of 
constitutional law, corporate “personhood” deserves a more 
nuanced analysis than has been typically offered in arguing in 
favor of an amendment to overturn Citizens United. Indeed, the 
concept of corporate “personhood” can in fact be marshaled in 
arguments against corporations being able to assert constitutional 
rights. In the nascent category of cases brought by corporations 
asserting rights of religious freedom, for example, corporations 
typically derivatively assert the religious claims of their 
shareholders. Attention to corporate “personhood” would lead 
courts to separate the claims of shareholders from those of the 
corporation itself, leading to a dismissal of corporate religious 
claims asserted on behalf of shareholders. 
Finally, I will propose that the concerns motivating the 
movement against corporate personhood should be ameliorated 
with adjustments in corporate governance rather than 
constitutional law. In corporate law, what we need are changes in 
corporate governance to make corporations more like persons, 
not less. Unlike persons, corporations are expected to act if they 
have only one goal—the production of shareholder value. People 
must balance a range of obligations, both moral and legal. 
Requiring corporations to attend to a broader range of 
stakeholders would make corporations more like people, would 
make them better citizens, and would make their political 
participation less problematic. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SEPARATENESS 
In 2014, the Court heard arguments in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby,13 a case contesting the so-called “contraceptive mandate” 
in the Affordable Care Act. As enacted, the Affordable Care Act 
contained a provision requiring companies over a certain size to 
provide its employees with health insurance that includes all 
medically approved forms of contraceptive care.14 Hobby Lobby 
sued, saying that the provision operated as a violation of the 
 
 13. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),15 which provides 
that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive 
means to further a compelling governmental purpose.16 Hobby 
Lobby argued that under traditional canons of statutory 
construction and under the Dictionary Act17, it should be 
considered a “person” under RFRA.18 While the case was limited 
to the statutory question, it presaged religious exercise cases 
certainly to be brought by corporations in the future. 
An arts and crafts retailer, Hobby Lobby is a big company, 
with over 20,000 employees and more than 600 stores. But it’s 
closerly held, with all its stock owned by members of one family—
the Greens of Oklahoma City—who are devout Christians. The 
Greens believe that four of the methods covered by the 
contraceptive mandate of the ACA are “abortifacients,” and 
argued that the mandate caused them to violate their genuinely-
held belief that human life begins at conception. At first glance, 
the Greens’ arguments appear to depend on corporate 
personhood. Indeed, they argued that Hobby Lobby deserved to 
be considered a person under RFRA. 
Nevertheless, as a group of corporate law professors argued 
in an amicus brief, a crucial aspect of Hobby Lobby’s argument 
turned on a rejection of corporate personhood. (I helped write the 
brief and was a signatory.19) The brief explained that “corporate 
personhood” simply expresses the idea that the corporation has a 
legal identity separate from its shareholders, employees, and 
other constituents. That separateness, the brief pointed out, is 
inherent in what it means to be a corporation. A “first principle” 
of corporate law is that “for-profit corporations are entities that 
possess legal interests and a legal identity of their own—one 
separate and distinct from their shareholders.” The very purpose 
of the corporation as a legal form is to create an entity “distinct in 
 
 15. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et 
seq. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(a) and (b). 
 17.  1. U.S.C. 1. 
 18. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–70. 
 19. The brief was filed on behalf of a group of forty-four law professors. The lead 
author of the brief was Jayne Barnard, James Goold Cutler Professor of Law at William 
and Mary. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of 
Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (10th Cir. argued June 27, 
2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_
court_preview/briefs-v3/13-354-13-356_amcu_cclp.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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its legal interests and existence from those who contribute capital 
to it.” 
This separateness means, among other things, that 
shareholders are not held liable for the debts of the corporation. 
That makes it possible for people to invest in corporate stock 
without overseeing the day-to-day activities of companies in 
which they invest and without risking every penny they own in 
case the corporation goes bankrupt. This separateness thus makes 
capital markets possible. And capital markets are essential for the 
development of a vibrant national economy. Separateness also 
means that corporations can exist long after the life of any 
individual that invests in, or works for, them. As Lynn Stout has 
pointed out, corporations in this way provide a mechanism for 
society to make long-term, intergenerational investments that are 
not linked to government or a specific family.20 In this light, it is 
not an overstatement to say that corporate separateness has been 
one of the legal innovations most important to the development 
of national wealth. 
The professors argued that separateness meant the Greens 
should not be able to attach their own religious beliefs to the 
corporation. The reason the Greens had chosen to form a 
corporation was to be able to operate the business without 
running the risk of losing their personal assets if the corporation 
went belly up. For purposes of liability, the Greens wanted 
separateness; they wanted “personhood” for the corporation. 
They should not then be able to stand in the shoes of the 
corporation for purposes of religion. The Greens’ argument was 
cursed with an internal inconsistency: to be a religious “person” 
with religious beliefs cognizable under RFRA, the company had 
to borrow the religious beliefs of the Greens. That is, to disregard 
the company’s personhood. 
The Supreme Court did not notice the inconsistency. It held, 
5–4, that the Greens could project their religious beliefs onto the 
corporation and refuse to provide their employees the required 
contraceptive-care benefits. Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion is 
evidence of the Court’s much-discussed pro-business tilt, to be 
sure.21 But it is also evidence that the Court did not understand 
 
 20. Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015). 
 21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 172–84 
(2014); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013); Paul Barrett & Greg Stohr, Supreme Court 
Shields Corporations From Liability Risks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, June 27, 2013, 
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the basics of corporate law. Its mistake was not an embrace of 
corporate personhood but a rejection of it. 
An additional aspect of corporate personhood is to create a 
mechanism in law to hold corporations accountable. Consider the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster. For three months in 2010, 
Americans woke to the news of another 50,000 barrels of crude 
oil spewing into the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico.22 We 
were justifiably outraged. In a legal system without corporate 
personhood, the channel for that outrage would be limited to 
lawsuits and criminal inquiries against individual human beings 
responsible—managers, workers, and contractors. That is 
important, of course. In any legal jurisdiction worth its salt, the 
search for culpable individuals has to be part of the settling-up of 
any man-made disaster. But it should not be all. Few human 
beings would have enough money to compensate those harmed 
by a massive disaster like Deepwater Horizon. Because a 
corporate entity is also on the hook, there’s a chance for 
something approaching real compensation or real responsibility. 
Corporate personhood is thus not only a mechanism for the 
creation of wealth (by encouraging investment), it is a mechanism 
for enforcing accountability (by providing a deep pocket to sue). 
All this is to say that the political rhetoric of “corporations 
are not people” is just that, and should not be used to guide our 
legal analysis. Corporate separateness is a crucial analytical tool 
in corporate law, both in encouraging investment and providing 
accountability. A corporation may have “no soul to be damned 
and no body to be kicked,”23 but corporate personhood is a 
valuable legal fiction that should not be jettisoned. 
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:  
A NULL SET? 
Not surprisingly, the leaders of the movement against 
“corporate personhood” do not spend much time talking about 
 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-27/supreme-court-shields-corporations-
from-liability-risks; Adam Liptak, Friend of the Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013, at 
BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-
defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all. 
 22. ON SCENE COORDINATOR REPORT, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 33 
(2011), available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf. 
 23. Attributed to Edward Thurlow, 1st Baron Thurlow, who was Lord Chancellor of 
Great Britain from 1778 to 1783. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to 
Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386 (1981). 
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these corporate law aspects of the concept. Though their 
arguments with regard to constitutional standing are inconsistent 
with these longstanding corporate notions, they do not appear to 
advocate for an eradication of corporate personhood in the sense 
of having a capacity to sue and be sued, to hold property, or to 
borrow money or issue stock in its own name. 
Instead, the cries of “corporations are not people” are usually 
meant as a placeholder for the assertion that corporations should 
not be able to claim the constitutional rights that human beings 
can. The question of corporate constitutional rights has been a 
matter of Supreme Court analysis for nearly 200 years, ever since 
the 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.24 
The question of which rights corporations should be able to claim 
does not have an easy answer. 
But one piece of analysis is indeed easy: the argument that 
corporations should not have standing to assert any constitutional 
right is quite weak indeed.25 Remember, the opposite of a 
constitutional right is a government power. If corporations have 
no rights, then governmental power in connection with 
corporations is at its maximum. That power can be abused, and 
corporate personhood is a necessary bulwark. A handful of 
examples illustrate the point. 
In 1971, the government sought to stop the New York Times, 
a for-profit, publicly-traded media conglomerate, and the 
Washington Post, which had gone public as a corporation only a 
few weeks previously, from publishing the leaked Pentagon 
Papers. In one of the most important free speech rulings of the 
Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court correctly decided that the 
papers had a First Amendment right to publish.26 At the time, no 
one seriously suggested that the correct answer to the 
constitutional question was that the Times and the Post, as 
corporations, had no standing to bring a constitutional claim at all. 
In 1992, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v Wade in a 
hard-fought case in which the right to choose was championed by 
plaintiff Planned Parenthood, a corporation.27 No one seriously 
suggested the organization had no standing to object to limits on 
its ability to provide abortions because of its status as a corporate 
 
 24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 25.   For an excellent analysis, see Brandon Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of 
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014). 
 26. N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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entity. Today, Google and other media companies are fighting 
government demands to disgorge the contents of their servers.28 
No one seriously suggests that the government’s power should be 
unchecked because the media companies, as corporations, have 
no Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches 
and seizures. If corporations were not able to claim the Fifth 
Amendment rights to be free of government takings, their assets 
and resources would always be at risk of expropriation. No one 
would invest in corporations, undermining the reason we have 
them in the first place. 
In fact, some of the leading opponents of corporate 
“personhood” have begun to concede the weakness of the 
argument that corporations should never be able to assert any 
constitutional right. For example, a recent update to the website 
of Free Speech for People seeks to reassure supporters that its 
advocacy of the People’s Rights Amendment would not affect the 
freedom of the press, even though its text purports to end all 
constitutional rights for corporations.29 The update argues that 
press freedoms would still be held by the individual human beings 
engaging in press activities, even when those individuals operate 
in a corporate form. According to this update, “The freedom of 
press applies to press/media functions regardless of whether a 
corporation owns and operates those functions.”30 
This interpretation of the PRA by its own authors embodies 
what appears to be a striking concession that the corporate form 
is immaterial to the analysis of speech or press freedoms. What 
apparently counts is the function at issue, not the status of the 
claimant. If a law or government actor infringes on the function 
of the press, then it will be subject to constitutional scrutiny, 
“regardless of whether a corporation owns and operates those 
functions.” In other words, corporate personhood is immaterial to 
 
 28. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Inc. and Accenture PLC in support of 
Appellant, Microsoft Co. v. U.S., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/12/15/amazon_microsoft_ireland_amicus_brief.pdf; Brief of 
Verizon Communications, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., Ebay Inc., 
Salesforce.com, Inc. and Infor, as Amici Curiae in support of Appellant, Microsoft Co. v. 
U.S., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. 2014), available at http://publicpolicy.verizon.com
/assets/images/content/Amicus_Brief_in_Microsoft_Search_Warrant_Case.pdf; Kim 
Zetter, Tech Giants Rally Around Microsoft to Protect Your Data Overseas, WIRED, Dec. 
15, 2014, available at http://www.wired.com/2014/12/microsoft-allies-fight-for-overseas-
data-privacy/. 
 29.  See supra at note 9. 
 30. The People’s Rights Amendment Protects Freedom of the Press, FREE SPEECH 
FOR PEOPLE, http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/FSFP%20on%20freedom
%20of%20the%20press.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
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the constitutional question, and a corporation can assert the 
constitutional right of freedom of the press if it “owns and 
operates those functions.” This reassurance is flatly inconsistent 
with the amendment’s proposed language that “corporate entities 
are subject to such regulations as the people, through their elected 
state and federal representatives, deem reasonable.” That 
language would allow a reasonable regulation of corporate-
owned newspapers; the update backtracks significantly but does 
not adjust the language of the proposed amendment. Is it that the 
amendment’s ban on corporate rights is not meant to apply when 
the corporation’s assertion of rights is to the benefit of natural 
persons? If so, when is that not the case? Remember that in 
Citizens United itself, the non-profit corporate claimant was 
asserting a First Amendment right to speak on behalf of, and to, 
natural persons. If the Amendment includes an implicit exception 
when a corporation is acting on behalf of or for the benefit of 
natural persons, then the People’s Rights Amendment would not 
change the outcome in the very case that motivated it. 
The Amendment does include a provision that “Nothing 
contained herein shall be construed to limit the people’s rights of 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free exercise of religion, 
and such other rights of the people, which rights are inalienable.” 
But that provision focuses on rights of people. If it operates as a 
savings clause for corporate rights of speech, press, and religion, 
then the amendment is toothless indeed and would not overturn 
the result in Citizens United itself. 
A second update purports to explain that the People’s Rights 
Amendment is not open to the criticism that it subjects 
corporations to uncompensated takings, as I argue above.31 The 
update explains that “While corporations are not among ‘we the 
people’ by and for whom the Constitution exists, corporations and 
other property are nonetheless secure from unconstitutional 
conduct by government.” This explanation is hard to decipher, 
since it is a logical impossibility for an entity to not have rights but 
nevertheless be “secure from unconstitutional conduct by the 
government.” Having a right is simply another way of saying that 
one is protected from unconstitutional acts; not having a right is 
merely another way of saying that there is no constitutional limit 
on government conduct toward you. So it cannot be the case that 
 
 31. The People’s Rights Amendment Protects Property Rights, FREE SPEECH FOR 
PEOPLE, http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/FSFP%20on%20property%20
rights.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
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corporations do not have rights but are still able to claim the 
government has acted unconstitutionally toward them.  
Perhaps this update should be taken to be saying something 
about the rights of shareholders, assumed to be those who “own” 
corporations (a highly contestable claim, by the way32). One way 
to understand the update is to see it as positing a right held by 
shareholders to assert a constitutional claim any time a 
corporation’s property is taken. Let us call this “property 
standing.” Or the update could mean that the corporation can 
derivatively assert the interests of its shareholders. Let us call this 
“derivative standing.” 
The update indeed seems to suggest that the PRA would 
allow both property and derivative standing. As for property 
standing, the update asserts that “human beings who have had 
their property taken . . . (including the shares held by people in 
the corporation) may invoke remedies under the 5th or 14th 
Amendment.” As for derivative standing, the update asserts “The 
corporation may also have standing to bring those arguments on 
behalf of their shareholders.” 
As with the update on press freedoms, these arguments are 
inconsistent with the text of the proposed amendment and with 
the claim that corporations should have no constitutional rights. 
These exceptions are in fact so broad that they would swallow the 
rule. If, for example, shareholders can assert that limits on 
corporate activities causing financial harm to them give them an 
independent constitutional claim, then limits on corporate speech 
would often affect shareholder returns as clearly as limits on other 
aspects of corporate behavior. As a matter of “property standing” 
there is no conceptual difference between a limit on corporate 
speech that decreases shareholder value and a taking of corporate 
property that decreases shareholder value. One cannot explain 
the difference by saying that corporations have no speech rights 
and do have property rights, because under the PRA they would 
have neither. So under the update, shareholders could sue to 
contest constraints on corporations that cause shareholders 
financial harm, which could include limits on corporate speech. 
Under this reasoning, the only effect of the PRA would be that 
instead of corporations bringing First Amendment challenges it 
would be the shareholders of those corporations bringing the 
challenges. The years of effort fighting for a 28th Amendment 
 
 32. Kent Greenfield, Are Shareholders Owners? Absolutely. And Absolutely Not, 66 
J. GOVERNANCE DIRECTIONS 479 (2014). 
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would result in the same claims being brought and argued, but on 
behalf of shareholders as plaintiffs instead of the corporation 
itself. 
Another oddity created by the supposed work-around of 
“property standing” is that many corporations covered by the 
PRA do not have shareholders. Consider my home institution, 
Boston College. Organized as a corporation, it would not be able 
to claim any constitutional rights itself under the terms of the 
PRA, because as a corporate entity it would be subject to “such 
regulations as the people . . . deem reasonable.” And shareholders 
cannot come to the rescue because Boston College has no 
shareholders. This is true of all non-profits—whether hospitals, 
charitable organizations, or political advocacy groups like Free 
Speech for People itself. Boston College is a legal person under 
Massachusetts law, but under the PRA it would have no 
constitutional rights and could be subject to uncompensated 
takings of its land, property, or other assets. And because it has 
no shareholders, there would be no human beings who could 
claim “property standing” to protect the corporation from 
governmental overreach. The irony of the “property standing” 
exception, then, would be that for-profit corporations would be 
protected from uncompensated takings because shareholders 
could raise the constitutional claims, but non-profit corporations 
would not be so protected. Chevron having more rights than 
Boston College surely cannot be the outcome intended by the 
PRA’s advocates. 
The notion of derivative standing is similarly problematic. 
Note that this is the same kind of exception to the “corporations 
have no rights” rule that the PRA advocates assert to save the 
freedom of the press. The corporation itself has no rights, they 
say, but the corporation can assert the rights of its constituents. 
There are multiple problems with this work-around, however. 
First, as mentioned above, many corporate entities do not have 
shareholders. And many corporations have only other 
corporations as shareholders. Subsidiaries, for example, are often 
entirely owned by a corporate parent. I presume that under the 
PRA, corporations would not “also have standing to bring 
[constitutional claims] on behalf of their shareholders” if those 
shareholders are also corporations. The resulting patchwork—
corporations with human shareholders could assert constitutional 
rights but corporations with no shareholders or with only 
institutional shareholders could not—would be awkward at best. 
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Worse, the “derivative standing” argument would undermine 
corporate separateness where it is most important. Remember the 
Hobby Lobby case, where the Green family bristled at burdens 
on their religious freedoms but used the corporation as the vessel 
for their complaints. Hobby Lobby asserted, in effect, derivative 
standing to bring its shareholders’ religious claims. If such 
derivative standing became the norm, we would see a drastic 
increase in the assertion of corporate constitutional claims for 
exemptions from regulations conflicting with their shareholders’ 
freedoms of speech or religion, whether those regulations 
pertained to contraceptive mandates or anti-discrimination laws.33 
Surely an increase in corporate constitutional claims is not an 
intended outcome of the PRA. But the proposed exception 
allowing corporations to assert the rights of their shareholders 
could have that very effect. 
The argument that corporations have no constitutional rights 
is simply unsustainable. Even the most adamant opponents of 
corporate constitutional rights cannot hold the line, offering up 
exceptions that recognize and even expand corporate rights. 
They, too, find themselves engaging in the very difficult analysis 
of which rights corporations may assert and which they do not. 
Their answers are problematic and inconsistent, but they 
recognize the necessity of the task. 
III. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: SOME 
BUT NOT ALL 
The question of which constitutional rights corporations can 
claim has bedeviled the Court and commentators for two 
centuries. Of course corporations are not genuine human beings 
and should not automatically receive all the constitutional rights 
that human beings claim. At the same time, as argued above, it is 
similarly obvious that corporations should be able to claim some 
constitutional rights. So which ones, and when? 
At a high level of generality, the answer to that question turns 
on both the purpose of the corporate form and the nature of the 
right asserted. In fact, few general statements can improve on 
Chief Justice Marshall’s in Dartmouth College: “Being the mere 
creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those properties 
which the charter of its creation confers upon it either expressly 
 
 33. See Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby and the Return of “The Negro Travelers’ 
Green Book,” THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Mar. 26, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/
hobby-lobby-and-return-negro-travelers-green-book. 
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or as incidental to its very existence.”34 In effect, the proper 
analysis of corporate constitutional rights asks what rights are 
“incidental to its very existence.” Then-Justice William 
Rehnquist, dissenting in First National Bank v. Bellotti, said it 
best. “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a 
corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by 
natural persons, . . . our inquiry must seek to determine which 
constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very existence.’”35 
This inquiry must thus necessarily begin with a discussion of 
what corporations are for, what purposes they serve. This in turn 
draws on a broad scholarly literature, in the corporate law field 
for the most part, about the purpose of the corporation. There is 
much disagreement about the question of—to borrow a phrase—
for whom are corporate managers trustees,36 that is, whether 
corporations should be managed primarily to serve shareholder 
interests or to serve a more robust set of stakeholder interests.37 
(More on that below.) But there is indeed broad consensus that 
for-profit corporations are economic entities, created for the 
purpose of benefiting society by creating wealth through the 
production of goods and services.38 The constitutional analysis 
should begin, then, with the presumption that for-profit 
corporations should receive the rights necessarily incidental to 
serving that economic purpose, and should not receive those that 
are not germane to that purpose. This presumption may be 
overcome in specific contexts or to further other constitutional 
values, but that is the starting place for analysis. 
The result will be a patchwork. Corporations cannot vote or 
serve on juries, for example; it does not make any sense to think 
of corporations asserting those rights, both because of the nature 
of the right and the nature of the corporate entity. Similarly, the 
 
 34. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 35. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 36. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145 (1932). For recent forays into this area, see Leo E. Strine, The Dangers of 
Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability 
Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
(forthcoming); U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-08, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576389; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: 
HOW PUTTING SJAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC (2012). 
 37. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) [hereinafter GREENFIELD, THE 
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW]. 
 38. I discuss this foundational purpose of corporations in GREENFIELD, THE 
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 37, at 125–42. 
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Court has held that corporations cannot assert the Fifth 
Amendment right to be free of self incrimination.39 The exclusion 
makes sense, since corporations could otherwise evade all kinds 
of disclosure obligations necessary to make markets work. It is 
easy to imagine the havoc created if, for example, General Motors 
had a constitutional right not to disclose safety defects in their 
cars. 
When the time comes, the Court should draw the same line 
with regard to the freedom to exercise religion. The right is to 
protect the freedom of conscience, and only actual human beings 
have a conscience. There should be allowances for genuine 
associations of religious people, such as churches. (In fact, the 
Catholic Church is organized as a corporation.40) But because of 
corporate separateness – that is, corporate personhood – it will be 
quite difficult for business companies to show that they are 
genuine associations of religious people. Moreover, when 
businesses win religious exemptions from regulation, the market 
is skewed in their favor and to the detriment of other market 
actors. That undermines society’s economic purpose of having 
corporations in the first place.41 
Should corporations be able to assert First Amendment free 
speech rights? The answer depends in part on whether the 
asserted right is inconsistent with corporations’ economic 
purpose. Sometimes it makes little sense to protect the First 
Amendment rights of corporations. Securities laws, for example, 
routinely require corporations to disclose to the public their 
financial wellbeing. If human beings were required to reveal 
personal finances to the public, they would rightly object to the 
requirement as coerced speech, subject to strict scrutiny under the 
First Amendment. But corporations’ arguments along those lines 
would fail, and they should. Disclosure is necessary for markets to 
work. A corporate right not to disclose would undermine the 
economic purpose of corporations themselves. In other words, a 
right not to disclose is not “incidental” to the “very existence” of 
corporations. The opposite is true. The Supreme Court agrees, in 
fact. In 2011, AT&T asked that information about its finances be 
excluded from Freedom of Information Act requests, because the 
 
 39. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
 40. WINKLER, supra note 5, at ch. 1; John Dewey, The Historic Background of 
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926). 
 41. Kent Greenfield, Op-Ed, Do Corporations Have Religious Liberty?, BOS. 
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2014, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/03/02/unfair-
advantage-would-spur-abuse-exempt-status/jKhgXAMJyxaiC3vjb7qGxH/story.html. 
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statute has an exception for “personal privacy.” The Court 
unanimously rejected this claim—and Chief Justice John Roberts 
ridiculed it in his opinion. That exception, he wrote, “does not 
extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it 
personally.”42 
On the other hand, the best understanding of corporate 
speech rights would include the ability of the corporation to speak 
publicly about matters germane to its economic role. That is, 
speech that is “incidental” to its very existence in the marketplace 
should receive protection. This includes commercial speech at 
least,43 and presumptively even that political speech concerning 
economic matters germane to the business.44 
But the question of germaneness is not likely to do all the 
work we need done in the free speech area. There are additional 
considerations at issue because of the nature of the right. 
Sometimes it is important to protect the speech rights of a 
corporation not because the communication is germane to the 
economic role of the business, but because of the rights of human 
listeners to hear what it has to say. The rights of listeners is what 
is actually at issue in many press cases, such as the Pentagon 
Papers case mentioned above. But it is not limited to press cases, 
and in fact has often been used by the Court to explain 
commercial speech cases. On occasion, what a corporation says is 
relevant to public debate,45 or necessary to give customers the 
information required for them to make decisions in the 
marketplace. 
It is worth pausing to recall that the idea that listeners have a 
right to hear the words of businesses began as a liberal idea. In the 
 
 42. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011). 
 43. This statement is subject to the straightforward caveat that commercial speech 
should not receive protection that is so great so as to undermine the economic role of 
corporations. For example, fraud and misrepresentation—even if protected in other 
speech contexts—need not be protected in commercial speech. See United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). In other words, intermediate scrutiny—current doctrine—
is about right for commercial speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Svc. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 44. For purposes of comparison, germaneness is a matter of constitutional 
importance in construing the rights of unions and union members. Under Abood v. Detroit 
Bd of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977), public employees have a First Amendment right 
not to have their union dues or fees used by the union for “the advancement of ideological 
causes not germane to its duties as collective bargaining representative.” 
 45.  The recent efforts on the part of corporations to block or limit “religious 
freedom” laws that could give businesses the right to discriminate against LGBTQ 
customers is an example. See, e.g., Nick Gass, Wal-Mart Slams Arkansas “Religious 
Freedom” Law, POLITICO (Apr. 1, 2015),  http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/arkansas-
hutchinson-rfra-walmart-116567.html. 
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1970s, Ralph Nader’s group Public Citizen brought a First 
Amendment challenge to limits on the commercial advertising of 
pharmacies.46 They argued these laws violated the public’s right to 
know. As Adam Winkler argues, it is not unfair to say that Public 
Citizen’s advocacy led directly to Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in 
Citizens United, in which he rested his protection of corporate 
speech rights not on corporate “personhood” but on the right of 
the public to know corporations’ views.47 Public Citizen may now 
decry corporate constitutional rights, but its work forty years ago 
helped get us to where we are today. 
For constitutional questions surrounding campaign finance, I 
agree with the personhood opponents that Citizens United 
wrongly expanded corporate rights to spend money on elections. 
I also agree that the Court’s mistake traces its origins to the 1976 
case Buckley v. Valeo, where the Court struck down limits on 
individual (human) campaign expenditures as violations of free 
speech. But the problem in Citizens United was not the Court’s 
supposed holding that corporations are people, and the problem 
in Buckley was not a supposed ruling that “money is speech.” 
Both are mischaracterizations, and the critical yelps they attract 
are poorly targeted in any event. The Court never said in Citizens 
United that corporations are people. Rather it said—incorrectly—
that corporations are “associations of citizens” and that protecting 
corporate rights was necessary to protect natural persons in the 
association. This is, by the way, the same mistake the PRA 
advocates make in their discussion of press freedom discussed in 
the previous section. As for Buckley, the Court never said money 
is speech. The Court said instead that money is sometimes 
essential to make speech audible above the din. Giving it, too, can 
be an expressive act. Those notions are certainly correct. Imagine 
if Texas told its citizens they could not contribute to Planned 
Parenthood or had to pay dues to the National Rifle Association. 
It would be inane to argue that the First Amendment would not 
be implicated because money is not speech. 
Nevertheless, there are myriad reasons why a commitment to 
free speech rights—even corporate free speech rights—should not 
bar reasonable limits on independent campaign expenditures 
 
 46. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
 47. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–72 (2010) (stating that “[t]he purpose 
and effect of this law is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit 
corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public”). See WINKLER, supra 
note 5. 
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from both corporations and the super rich. It is not hyperbole to 
say that without such limits, our democracy is at risk. The billions 
of dollars flooding the electoral process skews it toward the 
monied and well-heeled, and perverts the nature of public service. 
The current Court is so enamored with a simplistic, libertarian 
theory of free speech doctrine that it is blind to those risks. A sane 
Court could easily construct exceptions to otherwise applicable 
doctrine to protect the sanctity and fairness of our elections.48 In 
fact, Canada’s Supreme Court has done that very thing, saying, “If 
a few groups are able to flood the electoral discourse with their 
message, it is possible, indeed likely, that the voices of some will 
be drowned out.”49 They weighed the constitutional value of 
“equality in the political discourse . . . necessary for meaningful 
participation in the electoral process”50 against the value of 
unfettered spending, and decided that reasonable limits on 
spending was consistent with freedom of speech. 
But notice something. One can support campaign finance 
regulation, as the Canadian Supreme Court ruled, and still 
acknowledge corporate personhood and corporate constitutional 
rights as well. 
The focus on corporate spending may also distract from the 
fact that most of the money flooding into the electoral process is 
not coming from corporations. It’s coming from rich individuals 
like Sheldon Adelson and the Koch brothers. There is a lot of 
corporate money, to be sure. Chevron, the most politically active 
public corporation in 2012, spent $2.5 million in the 2012 cycle.51 
The Chamber of Commerce, the largest corporate bundler, 
funneled over $35 million into various 2012 races.52 But both were 
dwarfed by the torrent of individual money. Adelson alone threw 
almost $93 million into various races during the same period, and 
 
 48. See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
341 (2009). 
 49. Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Chevron’s contributions to outside groups is listed as #23 on this chart: 2012 Top 
Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org
/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=O (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
The three companies listed above them all are privately held, one by the Kochs. You can 
also check the fact here: Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay 
to Play: A Model Explaining Why the SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 12(2) CONN. PUB. 
INT. L. J. 361, 402 (2012–2013). 
 52. Andrew Prokop, 40 charts that explain money in politics, VOX (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/7/30/5949581/money-in-politics-charts-explain. 
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the Koch brothers ran a network of shady groups that spent over 
$400 million.53 
The power of corporations, to be sure, is frequently misused, 
usually to the advantage of the financial and managerial elite. 
Employees, communities, consumers, the environment, and the 
public interest in general are often elbowed aside in corporate 
decisionmaking, unless the corporation can make money by 
taking them into account. Corporations are managed aggressively 
to maximize shareholder return. As a result, the risks they run—
whether of oil spills in the Gulf or of financial crises erupting from 
Wall Street—are often unrecognized until too late. The 
executives who run American corporations do not generally think 
of themselves as having obligations to the public. The social 
contract of American corporations is thin. 
But these defects of corporate power, fundamental as they 
are, are not problems of constitutional law or corporate 
personhood. They are problems of corporate law, and they could 
be fixed by corporate law. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE POWER: A 
CORPORATE LAW FIX 
American courts forged sweeping protections for 
corporations during the Gilded Age, on both the constitutional 
and corporate fronts.54 Though this legal fortress was slowly 
breached during the Progressive and New Deal eras, in many 
ways we are back where we started. The Supreme Court over the 
last decade or so has applied twisted ideas of free speech and due 
process to wall corporations off from accountability.55 In 
corporate governance, after a mid-century pendulum swing 
toward more public-spiritedness, managers and investors are now 
once again fixated on maximizing shareholder value. 
In the last few years, however, there has been a pushback 
against the shareholder primacy norm. An article in the Harvard 
Business Review declared: 
There’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the companies that 
are most successful at maximizing shareholder value over time 
are those that aim toward goals other than maximizing 
 
 53. Id. at 6, 22. 
 54. See WINKLER, supra note 5; M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in CORP. L. STORIES 37 (J. Mark 
Ramseyer, ed., 2009). 
 55.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 172–84. 
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shareholder value. Employees and customers often know more 
about and have more of a long-term commitment to a company 
than shareholders do.56 
New York Times columnist Joe Nocera wrote that “it feels as 
if we are at the dawn of a new movement—one aimed at 
overturning the hegemony of shareholder value.”57 An opinion 
piece in The Financial Times recently argued that “[c]ompanies 
need a bigger and better purpose than simply maximising 
shareholder value.”58 A 2011 Forbes article called shareholder 
primacy “the dumbest idea in the world.”59 
The case against shareholder primacy was argued best by 
Steven Pearlstein in The Washington Post. Maximizing 
shareholder value, he wrote, is a “pernicious” ideology that “has 
no foundation in history or in law.”60 He continued, “What began 
in the 1970s and ‘80s as a useful corrective to self-satisfied 
managerial mediocrity has become a corrupting, self-interested 
dogma peddled by finance professors, money managers and over-
compensated corporate executives.” In fact, he argued, “much of 
what Americans perceive to be wrong with the economy these 
days—the slow growth and rising inequality; the recurring 
scandals; the wild swings from boom to bust; the inadequate 
investment in R&D, worker training and public goods—has its 
roots in this ideology.” 
These skeptics are popularizing what a number of legal 
scholars and I have been saying for quite a while—that 
corporations should be seen as having robust social and public 
obligations that cannot be encapsulated in share prices.61 Now, 
executives have legal obligations to take account of shareholder 
interests. Progressive corporate scholars argue these “fiduciary 
 
 56. Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Jul.–Aug. 2012, at 48, 57, available at https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders. 
 57. Joe Nocera, Down With Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A.19, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/opinion/nocera-down-with-shareholder-
value.html?_r=0. 
 58. Stefan Stern, Transcend Shareholder Value for All Our Sakes, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 
23, 2014, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a288288-583e-11e4-a31b-00144feab
7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3Is1UZ900. 
 59. Steven Denning, The Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value, 
FORBES Nov. 28, 2011, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/28/
maximizing-shareholder-value-the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/. 
 60. Steven Pearlstein, How the cult of shareholder value wrecked American business, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/09/09/how-the-cult-of-shareholder-value-wrecked-american-business/. 
 61. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 37; STOUT, 
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 36. 
IN DEFENSE OF_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015 1:44 PM 
2015] DEFENSE OF CORPORATE PERSONS 329 
 
duties” should be extended to employees and other corporate 
stakeholders.62 
One way to make these obligations operational is to make 
the decisionmaking structure of the company itself more 
pluralistic. In a number of European countries, for example, 
companies have “codetermined” board structures that require 
representation of both shareholders and employees.63 Even with 
these management structures, corporations continue their focus 
on building wealth—that is the core purpose of the corporate 
form—but not only for a narrow sliver of equity investors. And it 
works. Germany, where co-determination is strongest, is the 
economic powerhouse of Europe. The CEO of the German 
company Siemens argues that codetermination is a “comparative 
advantage” for Germany; the senior managing director of the U.S. 
investment firm Blackstone Group had said that codetermination 
was one of the factors that allowed Germany to avoid the worst 
of the financial crisis.64 
Notice that these governance structures reforms make 
corporations more like persons, not less. Human beings routinely 
balance a multitude of interests—I am, for example, a parent, a 
spouse, a teacher, a writer. Only the rare oddball behaves as if 
accumulating money is the paramount and unitary good.65 
Humans have consciences; corporations do not. Left to 
themselves, they will behave as if profit is the only thing that 
matters. The best way to constrain corporations is to require them 
to sign onto a more robust social contract and to govern 
themselves more pluralistically—mechanisms designed to mimic 
the traits of human personhood within the corporate form. 
 
 62. Kent Greenfield, Sticking the Landing: Making the Most of the “Stakeholder 
Moment,” 2015 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 147; Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder 
Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043 (2008); Marleen O’Connor, Restructuring the 
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced 
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991). 
 63. ALINE CONCHON, BOARD-LEVEL EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION RIGHTS IN 
EUROPE: FACTS AND TRENDS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.etui.org/Publications2/
Reports/Board-level-employee-representation-rights-in-Europe; see also MAP: Board-
Level Representation in the European Economic Area, Worker-Participation.EU, 
http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-
level-Representation2/MAP-Board-level-representation-in-the-European-Economic-
Area2. 
 64. CONCHON, supra note 63, at 8. 
 65. See Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens 
and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. 
REV. 799 (1997). 
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If corporations had these traits of personhood, I would worry 
less about corporate involvement in the political arena. American 
corporations have become a vehicle for the voices and interests of 
a small managerial and financial elite. The cure for this is more 
democracy within businesses—more participation in corporate 
governance by workers, communities, shareholders, and 
consumers. If corporations were more democratic, their 
participation in the nation’s political debate would be of little 
concern. 
Unfortunately, corporate personhood opponents are making 
these corporate governance reforms less likely. Personhood 
skeptics often characterize corporations as having a narrow social 
role; because of that narrow role, the argument goes, they owe it 
to shareholders to stay out of politics. The opponents of Citizens 
United are endorsing a narrow view of business as a way to explain 
why corporations should be exiled from the public square. To 
fight corporate personhood, they are bolstering shareholder 
primacy. 
Take for instance Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in 
Citizens United itself. He argued, among other things, that 
corporate speech should be limited in order to protect 
shareholders’ investments. Shareholders are seen as owners, as 
“those who pay for an electioneering communication” and are 
assumed to have “invested in the business corporation for purely 
economic reasons.”66 Stevens argued that corporate political 
speech did not merit protection because: 
[T]he structure of a business corporation . . . draws a line 
between the corporation’s economic interests and the political 
preferences of the individuals associated with the corporation; 
the corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim 
to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how 
persuasive the arguments for a broader . . . set of priorities.67 
Even more revealing, Stevens cites as support a set of 
corporate governance principles adopted by the prestigious 
American Law Institute. The Principles were the product of 
compromise, both asking corporations to look after shareholder 
interests and allowing them to act with an eye toward “ethical” 
and “humanitarian” purposes. But Stevens quoted only the 
language embodying shareholder primacy: “A corporation . . . 
 
 66. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 475–76 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 469–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with 
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”68 
Opponents of corporate personhood are following Stevens 
into the shareholder rights trap. Common Cause now has a 
“featured campaign” for “strengthening shareholder rights.”69 
The Brennan Center for Justice is supporting a “shareholder 
protection act” and calls shareholders “the actual owners” of 
corporations.70 Professor Jamie Raskin of American University, 
one of the smartest and most energetic academic opponents of 
Citizens United, says that corporations should not be spending in 
elections because, “after all, it’s [shareholders’] money.”71 This is 
all shareholder primacy language brought to bear in fighting 
Citizens United. 
Wall Street loves talk of shareholder rights. To be sure, many 
Americans are shareholders through our retirement accounts and 
the like. But “widows and orphans”72 are still the minority; most 
stock held in American businesses is owned by the very wealthy. 
(The richest 5% of Americans own over 2/3 of all stock assets. The 
bottom 40%—125 million working class people —essentially own 
nothing in terms of stock.73) So when opponents of Citizens United 
focus on shareholder rights, they are singing Wall Street’s tune. 
I wish this shareholder-protective rhetoric was just that, but 
it is not. Corporate personhood opponents urge, as an 
intermediate measure short of a constitutional amendment, that 
corporations be required to seek shareholder approval before 
spending corporate money on political campaigns. There might be 
 
 68. Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.01(a), p. 55 (1992)). See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1271 (1993), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2024. 
 69. Money in Politics, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/issues/
money-in-politics/. 
 70. Elizabeth Kennedy, Protecting Shareholders after Citizens United, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUST. (July 13, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/protecting-
shareholders-after-citizens-united. 
 71. Jamie B. Raskin, A shareholder solution to ‘Citizens United’, WASH. POST (Oct. 
3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-shareholder-solution-to-citizens-
united/2014/10/03/5e07c3ee-48be-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html. 
 72. Widow-and-Orphan Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms
/w/widowandorphanstock.asp (last visited May 18, 2015) 
 73. Wealth groups’ shares of assets, by asset type, 2010, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 20, 
2012), http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/chart/swa-wealth-table-6-6-wealth-groups-
shares/; Wealth groups’ shares of total household stock wealth, 1983-2010, ECONOMIC 
POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/chart/swa-
wealth-figure-6g-wealth-groups-shares/. 
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some benefit to such a rule, since it would help ensure executives 
do not spend corporate monies on issues and candidates opposing 
company interests. But that benefit is probably marginal, and 
would come at the risk of validating corporate involvement in the 
political process in furtherance of shareholder value and to the 
detriment of other stakeholders. Corporations could speak out in 
favor of Wall Street but not employees? That would be worse, not 
better. 
The efforts of anti-personhood activists are not only in 
tension with stakeholder theory on the conceptual level. In the 
political arena, too, a tension exists because the energy for reform 
is a finite resource. I believe that, in this moment, there is an 
opening to question the very framework of how we view 
corporations and their social obligations. But we won’t get 
anywhere on that front if the progressive left wastes its energy 
fighting for a constitutional amendment that is unlikely to succeed 
and would either be toothless or affirmatively harmful if it did. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are numerous reasons to question the reasoning and 
outcome in Citizens United, 74 and a multitude of legitimate 
worries about its implications for our democracy.75 But the 
significant efforts of activists, lawyers, and academics aimed at 
ending corporate personhood are being misspent. Corporate 
personhood did not drive the result in Citizens United, and it is 
unclear how ending corporate personhood would change the 
outcome. Indeed, an insistence on corporate personhood would 
avoid results in cases such as Hobby Lobby, which depend on 
courts’ willingness to ignore the separation between corporations 
and their shareholders. 
The worries that the deluge of independent expenditures will 
pervert our democracy are legitimate, but must come to terms 
with the fact that the source of the skewing at present is 
predominantly that of wealthy individuals, not corporations. A 
focus on corporate money in electoral politics is to fixate on what 
is a relatively minor problem at worst. The question of corporate 
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personhood is simply immaterial to broader remedy, whether by 
way of a doctrinal shift or even a constitutional amendment. 
The legitimate worries about corporate power are not best 
dealt with by way of constitutional amendment. Corporate power 
is primarily a problem of corporate governance and regulation, 
not a problem of constitutional law. Here, too, corporate 
personhood should be embraced rather than shunned. Indeed, if 
corporations were structured so they behave more like people, we 
would have less reason to worry about their involvement in 
politics. 
